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A national human rights institution is a body specialized in the promotion and protection of human 
rights within a state. There are clear prohibitions with respect to membership in national human rights 
institutions and to addressing complaints. These prohibitions set forth the limits of the functions of 
national human rights institutions; clarify their status and nature; elucidate the relationships between 
them and the legislative, executive and the judiciary; and direct future trends and development of 
national human rights institutions.
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After more than half a century of development, the establishment and operation of 
national human rights institutions have been matured and perfected in many aspects, 
forming different types with typical representativeness. However, currently, there is no 
uniform definition for a human rights institution within the international community of 
the United Nations. A very important reason for this is that the international provision 
about the human rights institutions is open. So practices in different states are the only 
way to conclude and summarize the relationship between national human rights institu-
tions, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. The promotion and protection of hu-
man rights is an important function of national human rights institutions and any matter 
relating to human rights should fall within their competence. However, in the process of 
addressing complaints, many countries have prohibitive provisions regarding complaints 
that may not be heard by human rights institutions. Additionally, there are similar pro-
hibitive provisions regarding the membership of national human rights institutions. In 
fact, these prohibitions clearly limit the functions of national human rights institutions. 
and upon which, this study and analysis will provide deeper understanding of the nature, 
status and development trends of human rights institutions within a state.
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1. The prohibitive provisions of membership in national human rights institutions
The prohibitive provisions relating to national human rights institutions are em-
bodied in two primary aspects: membership qualifications for human rights institutions 
and the scope of addressing complaints. The composition of personnel is the first issue 
relating to the establishment and functions of a national human rights institution. The 
prohibitive provisions vary in different countries in terms of the specific conditions for 
membership in a human rights institution, but they are generally consistent with respect 
to situations that prohibit membership in a human rights organization. The consistency 
of the prohibitions on membership is a reflection of the nature and character of national 
human rights institutions. The membership prohibitions set forth by the Human Rights 
Commission of Thailand are representative. The relevant laws provide that members of 
the Human Rights Commission of Thailand shall not hold office as permanent civil ser-
vants or receive remuneration; they may not hold office in government agencies, state-
owned companies or local government departments (including leadership positions or as 
staff members, directors or consultants); and they shall not hold office in other for-profit 
enterprises or be employed by an individual. In the event of such circumstances, the 
member may, with the consent of the Senate, be elected to act as a member of the Human 
Rights Commission and shall be able to commence his or her duties only after resigning 
from said body. Resignation shall be completed within 15 days from the date of election 
or the person will be deemed to have never been elected as a member and a new member 
shall be elected1.
It can be seen from the above that a member of a human rights institution may not 
hold any office in any other national agency, and if that is the case, he or she can only 
choose one position and part-time positions are not permitted. After being elected as 
a member of a human rights institution, members must not use their power or influ-
ence to serve their own interests. The prohibitive provisions of membership in such 
human rights bodies highlight the characteristics of the independence of human rights 
institutions. The so-called independence of human rights institutions assists in the pro-
motion and protection of human rights. While the functions of human rights institu-
tions consist primarily of the effective oversight of the legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches, the quality of the supervision requires a higher level of independence. Only 
when independent of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches can human rights 
institutions effectively exercise the power of supervision. The exclusive appointment 
for membership in a human rights institution or the prohibition of a concurrent post 
is precisely to ensure the independence of these institutions. Of course, to ensure the 
independence of human rights institutions, the independent composition of personnel 
is an essential safeguard.
2. Prohibitive provisions on the scope of addressing complaints 
submitted to national human rights institutions
National human rights institutions with the function of addressing complaints can, 
in general, conduct investigations and make decisions on cases of suspected violations of 
human rights either on their own initiative or upon application. Before planning an inves-
1 See Article 7 of the National Human Rights Commission Act of Thailand.
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tigation, the human rights institution will conduct a preliminary review of the complaint 
to decide whether or not to accept it. Many national human rights institutions do not 
clearly define the types of complaints they accept but they do list the types of complaints 
that shall not be accepted, and such prohibitions form the limits of their duties. 
First, if a complaint brought before a human rights institution is already being heard 
in accordance with judicial proceedings, then the human rights institution is not com-
petent to accept it. If a human rights institution accepts a complaint and subsequently 
finds that it is being heard by the judiciary, the investigation should cease immediately. 
If the case has been tried by a judicial institution and a judgment has been rendered, the 
human rights institution may not investigate or otherwise address the complaint. The 
Human Rights Commission of Malaysia provides that it may not conduct an investigation 
on the incident of a complaint if the matter is being tried, including on appeal or if a deci-
sion has already been made by the court. Once the judiciary has begun to investigate, the 
commission must immediately stop investigating2. The legislation also makes it clear that 
complaints shall not be accepted by the Mongolian Human Rights Commission, includ-
ing criminal or civil cases, if they are being tried or have been concluded3. Further, some 
national human rights institutions prohibit their members from bringing civil or criminal 
proceedings before the court on behalf of the complainant. In accordance with the rel-
evant provisions of the Human Rights Protection Act, the Human Rights Commission of 
Mauritius has no power on its own to refer cases directly to the court. If the commission 
considers that a violation of human rights constitutes a crime, the case must be referred 
to the prosecutor to be charged4. In the case of human rights violations, the complainant 
may either file a suit in court seeking remedies through a judicial approach or initiate a 
complaint before a human rights institution for protection. However, if the complainant 
chooses the former, he or she cannot also bring a complaint to the human rights institu-
tion at the same time or the complaint before the human rights institution will not be ac-
cepted. The handling of complaints by human rights institutions is a useful and necessary 
supplement to the work of the judicial branch. National human rights institutions are not 
permitted to receive cases that are being tried by the judiciary mainly out of respect for 
the independence and authority of the judicial branch. This also reflects the fact that the 
promotion and protection of human rights by national human rights institutions should 
complement not substitute the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.
On the basis of the above, national human rights institutions may, under certain cir-
cumstances, investigate, participate in, or pay attention to cases before the judiciary. While 
national human rights institutions are complementary to the protection of human rights 
provided by the judicial branch, they still have the duty of oversight, the existence of which 
requires that human rights institutions exercise effective supervision of the judiciary on 
the basis of respect for judicial independence. 
2 Article 12(2) of the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999, Act 597 provides the following: 
‘The Commission shall not inquire into any complaint relating to any allegation of the infringement of 
human rights which— (a) is the subject matter of any proceedings pending in any court, including any 
appeals; or (b) has been finally determined by any court’.
3 See the website of the Human Rights Commission of Mongolia: www.nhrc-mn.org, accessed on 20 
September 2014.
4 See the website of the Human Rights Commission of Mauritius: http://www.mhr.gov.mu, accessed 
on 5 September 2014.
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In practice, human rights institutions in a number of countries may, in cases permitted 
by the court, investigate cases that are being tried by the judiciary. According to the Nepal 
National Human Rights Commission Act, the commission may, with the permission of the 
court, investigate any unresolved complaints of human rights violations5. A human rights 
institution may also apply to the court for appropriate participation in legal proceedings 
in accordance with the relevant rules of procedure of the court hearing the case in order 
to provide legal assistance to the complainant. Members of the Australian Commission on 
Human Rights and Equality of Opportunity can appear in court on human rights cases and 
provide expert advice on human rights law before the tribunal6. Even if the human rights 
institution can participate in and understand the cases that are being heard by the judiciary. 
The institutions’ participation should also be subject to the consent of the judicial branch or 
in accordance with legal procedures. In conclusion, the functions of national human rights 
institutions must not undermine the independence and authority of the judicial branch 
and monitoring by the institution should be conducted pursuant to legal procedures.
Secondly, human rights institutions will not accept cases that fall outside their juris-
diction. The scope of jurisdiction is primarily to monitor human rights violations com-
mitted by national institutions such as the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary, 
to provide remedies to the complainant, and to urge the relevant state organs to make 
amends. Among such national institutions, their administrative organs are extensive and 
comprehensive and they are closely linked to the vital interests of the people. Thus, ad-
ministrative actions have become the focus of supervision for human rights institutions. 
In general, cases of human rights violations are within the jurisdiction of human rights 
institutions as long as the cases involve the actions of national institutions. Ordinary civil 
and economic disputes between citizens and corporate legal entities do not fall within the 
scope of national human rights institutions. The Law of the Republic of Armenia on the 
Human Rights Defender clearly stipulates that the human rights defender shall consider 
the complaints of individuals (including citizens) regarding violations of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms provided by the constitution, laws and the international trea-
ties of the Republic of Armenia, as well as the principles and norms of the international 
laws promulgated by state and local self-governing bodies and their officials7. 
Complaints heard by the Human Rights Commission of Costa Rica include com-
plaints about administrative injustice or misconduct and complaints about abuses of pow-
er by government officials8. The law clearly stipulates that the following two cases do not 
fall within the jurisdiction of the Spanish Ombudsman: (1) relevant events in which the 
public administration departments are not involved and (2) conflicts and disputes among 
citizens9. Additionally, the National Human Rights Commission of Mauritius cannot ac-
cept and does not have the power to investigate private disputes or complaints against 
5 Article 9(2)(d) of the Human Rights Commission Act, 2053(1997) (Nepal): “The human rights 
commission can inquire into a matter with the permission of the court in respect of any claim on violations 
of human rights which is sub-judice in the court.”
6 Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986: “In cases where the Human Rights Commission 
deems it necessary, it may, with the permission of the tribunal, participate in the proceedings and make 
recommendations on human rights issues.”
7 See Article 7(1) of the Law of Republic of Armenia on the Human Rights Defender.
8 See the website of the Human Rights Commission of Costa Rica: http://www.dhr.go.cr, accessed on 
20 September 2014.
9 See the website of the Defensor del pueblo: www.defensordelpueblo.es, accessed on 22 July 2014.
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private employers such as private lawyers and doctors10. It is evident that national human 
rights institutions are primarily responsible for monitoring violations of human rights 
by state institutions, with a focus on monitoring the actions of the executive. Ordinary 
civil and economic disputes between private persons do not fall within the jurisdiction 
of a human rights institution unless the dispute constitutes a manifest violation of one’s 
fundamental rights or freedoms. For cases not falling within the jurisdiction of a human 
rights institution, the case will typically be referred to the competent authorities or may be 
rejected under specific circumstances.
In addition, a number of cases are excluded from the scope of human rights institu-
tions due to the level of technicality or the specific facts of the situation. Cases outside the 
scope of the state do not fall within the competence of human rights institutions, such as 
cases involving intergovernmental or governmental relations with international organiza-
tions. This indicates that a national human rights institution is a national body, as a spe-
cialized agency, that specializes in the promotion and protection of human rights within 
the sovereignty of a country.
Lastly, human rights institutions will not accept cases that are submitted after a cer-
tain period of time, that are anonymous, or that are false. These provisions are rather tech-
nical and have little to do with the nature and status of national human rights institutions, 
many of which clearly state that the complainant will not be heard if he or she knows or 
should have known that his or her rights have been violated for more than a certain pe-
riod of time. The primary purpose is to encourage the complainant to actively safeguard 
his or her legitimate rights and interests after the occurrence of the infringement so as to 
facilitate the investigation and evidence collection by the human rights institution. On 
the other hand, it is also intended to reduce the unnecessary workload of human rights 
institutions and to prevent them from being overwhelmed by a large number of aging 
cases. Anonymous or false complaints can make it impossible for them to verify relevant 
information, which can cause unnecessary work and a waste of resources.
3. The relationship between national human rights institutions 
and other national organs 
National human rights institutions, when compared with the legislative, executive, 
and judicial branches, are a novelty. From the very beginning of their establishment, the 
development of human rights institutions has a history of only about 60 years. As a new 
type of national institution, it is of great importance to understand how national human 
rights institutions, as a whole, are related to the traditional three branches of government.
From the standpoint of the prohibitive provisions of national human rights institu-
tions, they should be independent of the legislature, executive, and judicial branches, and 
supervising the activities of other state organs is one of their most important functions. 
At the same time, human rights institutions are also a useful complement to the promo-
tion and protection of human rights provided by the three branches of government. This 
10 For example, several people have complained that their neighbours trespass over their property in 
carrying out construction projects. They claim that their rights to their property are sacrosanct and that 
the commission should intervene to protect such rights. These disputes among private parties can only be 
resolved by the courts. See page 10 of the 2001 Annual Report of the National Human Rights Commission 
of Mauritius.
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oversight and complementarity have determined the independence of human rights insti-
tutions, which has become a fundamental principle for the establishment and functioning 
of human rights bodies and must be guaranteed in all aspects. First, as a legal safeguard, 
it should be clearly stipulated in the constitution or other related laws on the status of 
national human rights institutions that independence is the most fundamental condition. 
Second, concerning organizational structure safeguards, the institutions should not be 
attached to the three branches of government and must be independent, where national 
human rights institutions report directly to the heads of parliament or government but 
are not subordinate to the legislative or executive branches. Third, the composition of 
personnel safeguards focus on the broad and representative membership of human rights 
institutions in order to facilitate performance independent of government responsibilities. 
Lastly, financial security provides human rights institutions with sufficient funds that can 
be independently managed to ensure the fulfilment of their responsibilities. Of course, the 
above points should be specified clearly in the form of legal provisions.
Although human rights institutions are independent of the three power organs, they 
are not a fourth power organ, and the three branches of government are still the basic in-
stitutions for the protection of human rights, which are monitored and supplemented by 
the human rights institutions. Therefore, the independence of human rights institutions 
is not absolute and is closely tied to the three branches of government. First, regarding the 
legislature, the primary members of human rights institutions are generally elected by it, 
the budget is generally adopted by it, and the annual report is generally submitted to it. 
Oversight of the executive branch is the primary function of the human rights institution. 
In this process, the human rights institution must cooperate with other administrative 
agencies (in relation to the object being monitored) or must inform the parent body of the 
executive organ and draw attention to violations of human rights protection. Moreover, 
in practice, human rights institutions in a number of countries are directly accountable to 
the executive heads and report to them on their work. There is also a closer relationship 
between the judicial branch and human rights institutions. In practice, the exercise of the 
functions of the judicial branch represent trends in the exercise of the duties of national 
human rights institutions and should also represent the direction of their development. 
Many of them are given some degree of quasi-judicial power, which is a manifestation of 
the close relationship between the two parties.
In summary, the national human rights institution is independent of the legislature, 
executive and judiciary, but it is not a fourth type of power. The national human rights 
institution is closely linked to the three branches of the government. It supervise and 
supplement them, and it also rely on the traditional authority of the three branches in 
performing its duties. Therefore, the independence of human rights institutions cannot 
be absolute and in practice, the framework of the three branches of government relative 
to legislative, administrative, and judicial independence provides the actual degree of 
independence needed to perform their duties. The definition of the relationship between 
national human rights institutions and the three branches of government can be summed 
up as national institutions working in close cooperation with them and being dedicated 
to the promotion and protection of human rights and to the independent exercise of their 
functions.
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4. The development patterns and trends of national human rights institutions
4.1. The emergence of national human rights institutions is an inevitable choice 
for a state to enhance the level of human rights protection. Compared with other state 
organs, such as the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, national human rights 
institutions have only a history of about 60 years, but they have been established in more 
than 100 countries and regions throughout 5 continents: Asia, America, Europe, Oceania, 
and Africa. The rapid growth in the number of institutions and in the broad scope of 
their distribution indicates that these institutions are widely supported and recognized by 
the international community and many countries around the world. The establishment 
of national human rights institutions accommodates the common understanding that 
human rights are essentially domestic matters of a state and these institutions are able 
to assume the responsibility for the promotion and protection of human rights in a 
country. At the same time, national human rights institutions have adapted themselves 
to the three-dimensional requirements of human rights protection, have performed their 
duties of protecting human rights in conjunction with international and regional human 
rights protection institutions, and have played an increasingly important role in this three-
dimensional human rights protection system. In short, national human rights institutions 
can make up for the inadequacy of traditional domestic human rights protection and can 
form a secure three-dimensional human rights protection network with international and 
regional human rights protection institutions and can also serve to bridge and raise the 
level of the promotion and protection of human rights domestically and internationally. 
Therefore, whether across the globe or within the sovereignty of a country, national human 
rights institutions are the inevitable choice to adapt to new developments in the protection 
of human rights and to improve the human rights protection level.
4.2. There will be a long-term coexistence of different types of national human rights 
institutions. Pluralism is a salient feature of national human rights institutions. There are 
two main reasons for this. First, the national human rights institution, as a relatively new 
type of organization, is still in its developmental and exploratory period and universally 
accepted principles or standards have not yet been formed in many aspects. Thus, they 
must be accumulated and summarized through constant practice. Pluralism is therefore 
an inevitable choice in this stage. Second, economic conditions, political systems and the 
legal traditions in different countries vary, which is the foundation of the establishment of 
national human rights institutions. The different contexts also make it clear that human 
rights institutions cannot be of one type and that different types will coexist for a very long 
time. That, however, does not mean there will be increasingly more and more types. With 
the development of practice and the deepening of theoretical research, several models 
or types of human rights institutions will be formed throughout the world that will be 
recognized as suitable for different countries and representatives. Some of the existing 
national human rights institutions that do not follow the Paris Principles, for example, will 
continue to decline until they are eliminated.
4.3.  The status and independence of national human rights institutions will be 
increasingly improved. Whether national human rights institutions can really play a role in 
the promotion and protection of human rights and whether the effectiveness of their functions 
can be improved depend, to a large extent, on ensuring their status and independence. Only 
by improving the status of human rights institutions so that they are at least ‘equal’ to other 
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state bodies can effective oversight and advice be exercised without interference from the 
legislative, executive or judicial branches in the performance of their duties. 
To improve the status and independence of human rights institutions, we should con-
sider the following aspects. First, establishing legal basis, a mode should be taken where 
the constitutional provisions are regarded as a principle with special legislation should be 
in place based on constitutional provisions at the same time. The constitutional authority 
is sufficient to safeguard the status of human rights institutions, while special legislation 
provides for the organization of the human rights institution, its personnel, funds, and 
other matters and also protects its functions. The establishment of human rights bodies 
in the form of presidential decrees and other administrative orders makes it difficult to 
ensure that the functions of the human rights institutions are not only consistent with the 
Paris Principles but will not be abandoned in practice. Second, regarding the structure, hu-
man rights institutions should not be attached to any other institution and should not be 
subject to legislative, administrative, or judicial authority. Human rights institutions should 
be directly accountable to and should also report to the parliament. If the institutions are 
attached to one of the three branches of the government or if they take orders from an 
executive head or a judicial officer, this will inevitably have a negative impact on the inde-
pendence of the human rights institutions. Third, regarding personnel and funding issues, 
elections, appointments, and dismissals of personnel should be based on legal procedures 
and they should be elected or removed by the parliament. Budgets should be considered 
and approved by the parliament not by the relevant administrative departments.
4.4.  The enforcement of national human rights institutions will continue to be 
strengthened. National human rights institutions have an independent status and do not 
belong to the legislative, executive, or judicial branches and therefore, do not have cor-
responding legislative, executive, or judicial powers. This guarantees the functioning of 
national human rights institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights only 
through special authorization of the law, giving them power to cooperate with other state 
organs. It is because of the independent status of national human rights institutions and 
the nature and quality of their functions that there is a need to empower national human 
rights institutions to carry out their mandates so as to ensure the effectiveness of those 
functions.
Addressing complaints is the core function of many national human rights institu-
tions, most of which involve cases of human rights violations or the protection of human 
rights by state organs. In other words, the respondent is often a state organ or other of-
ficial institution because it is clearly stated in many countries that disputes between in-
dividuals are inadmissible. As a respondent, that is, the party violating human rights, the 
relevant state organs in the field have the appropriate state power to exercise their duties. 
These organs are in a stronger position compared with the complainant and the human 
rights institution. It is therefore imperative that human rights institutions should be given 
a certain level of enforcement power in order to counterbalance the state organ violating 
human rights. Thus, the Paris Principles require the state to give quasi-judicial power to 
national human rights institutions. In practice, relevant legislation in many countries has 
stipulated to the mandatory and binding power of human rights institutions and confers 
on them the right to cooperate with other legally obligated state organs. 
The three main functions of national human rights institutions are addressing com-
plaints, monitoring and proposal, dissemination and education, which are presented from 
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the strongest function to the weakest according to the standards of enforcement. The func-
tion of addressing complaints must have enforcement power to ensure performance due 
to specific content. The functions of monitoring and proposal are generally non-binding 
as national human rights institutions only have the power to make suggestions and adopt-
ing such suggestions depends on the decisions of the relevant state organs. In practice, 
however, this function of the human rights mechanism has increasingly been showing a 
mandatory dimension. For example, faced with advice from human rights institutions, the 
relevant state organs must provide, within a certain period of time, a written reply to il-
lustrate the corrective measures taken and the results achieved. Reasons for refusal should 
also be stated in writing. If the advice from human rights institutions is ignored, this 
should be reported to the parent institutions through supervision, or they should report to 
parliament on implementation. The compulsion of overseeing and advisory functions of 
national human rights institutions are still weaker than the functions related to addressing 
complaints due to different content, but are also constantly strengthening.countries have 
adopted annual plans or programs to enhance their programmatic pertinence, continuity, 
and stability. All of these are compatible with the trend towards increasing the enforce-
ment power of national human rights institutions.
5. Summary
It is very important to clarify the relationship between the traditional three branches 
of government and national human rights institutions and the performance of exercising 
their functions to promote and protect human rights. Due to the openness of national 
human rights institutions provided by international instruments and different national 
circumstances, the type of the national human rights institution, the specific modalities 
of their functions and their relationships with other state organs vary significantly. The 
prohibitive provisions of national human rights institutions are, in fact, a direct limit to 
the functions of human rights institutions in some respects and a dividing line between 
human rights institutions and other state organs. These prohibitions are clearly defined 
and are fundamental, which also indicate the direction and trends of the development of 
national human rights institutions. The independent exercise of the functions of national 
human rights institutions towards the promotion and protection of human rights indi-
cates a complementary, cooperative, and supervisory relationship with other state organs 
that jointly promote and protect the development of human rights.
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